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WRONGFUL DISCHARGE: THE USE OF FEDERAL
LAW AS A SOURCE OF PUBLIC POLICY

Nancy Modesitt*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Since the 1970s, states have increasingly recognized claims brought
by employees who allege that their employment was terminated in
violation of public policy. 1 Indeed, as of 2004, the judiciary of forty-five
states had recognized such claims. 2 The change in the way judges have
viewed wrongful termination claims has created a significant increase in
potential claims that employees can bring if they are terminated, and the
pros and cons of this expansion of claims have been much discussed by
legal scholars. 3
The key focus of most legal scholars has been on the judicial
recognition of claims based on a policy embodied by state law. 4 Relatively
>I< Acting Academic Coordinator, Legal Rhetoric Program, Washington College of Law,
American University. I would like to think Penny Pether for her invaluable support and
insightful comments on this Article, and Jessica Sprovtsoff, Jonathan Schalit, and Gilbert
Tsai for their research assistance.
1. See DANIEL P. WESTMAN & NANCY M. MOOESITI, WHISTLEBLOWING: THE LAW OF
RETALIATORY DISCHARGE 11,95 (2d ed. 2004) [hereinafter WHISTLEBLOWING] (noting the
expansion of whistleblower protections in the 1970s and 1980s).
2. Id. at 95.
3. Cf Alex Long, The Disconnect Between At-Will Employment and Tortious
Interference with Business Relations: Rethinking Tortious Interference Claims in the
Employment Context, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 491, 517 (2001) ("The employment at-will doctrine
has been under attack for over thirty years. Since Lawrence E. Blades' 1967 article
criticizing the rule and calling for its replacement with a just cause standard, the rule has
been subject to intense debate.").
4. See, e.g., Benjamin S. Haley, Note, Porterfield v. Mascari II, Inc.: "A Clear
Mandate of Public Policy" Remains Unclear in Maryland's Wrongful Discharge
Jurisprudence, 63 MD. L. REv. 605 (2004) (reviewing a case where the discharge of an atwill employee who wanted to consult an attorney was upheld as non-violative of public
policy); Michael L. Matula, Twenty Years After Murphy v. City of Topeka: An Overview of
Kansas Retaliatory and Public Policy Wrongful Discharge Law, 72 J. KAN. B. ASS'N 20
(Feb. 2003) (discussing Kansas' public policy exception to the employment at-will
doctrine); James W. Riner, et ai., Wrongful Discharge ofAt-Will Employees in Missouri, 59
J. Mo. B. 34 (Jan.-Feb. 2003) (discussing Missouri's adoption of a public policy exception
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little attention has been paid to whether judges have recognized claims
based on federal, rather than state law. s This lack of attention is
particularly fascinating because the sheer volume of federal statutes and
regulations suggests that judicial recognition of federal law as a basis for a
public policy claim could vastly increase the protections available to
employees. It also has the potential to raise thorny legal issues such as the
potential preemption of state common law by the federal law cited as the
source of public policy.6 But perhaps most problematic, and least
discussed, are the problems associated with judicial recognition of state
common law wrongful discharge claims which rely upon federal law as a
source of public policy yet which are not subject to the limitations written
into the federal law. 7
This Article focuses on this neglected area of the law. In Part II, this
Article follows the development of the jurisprudence regarding whether
states recognize federal law as a basis for a state law claim for wrongful
termination. Part III analyzes and critiques the three main approaches
courts have taken in evaluating the use of federal law as a source of public
policy. Part IV proposes an alternative framework for determining whether
a federal law can be the source of public policy for a claim for wrongful
discharge in violation of public policy.

to the at-will employment doctrine); Richard A. Morris, Note, Smith v. Bates Technical
College: Washington Extends the Availability of the Tort of Wrongful Discharge in
Violation of Public Policy, But a Little Too Far: Employees Should Still Exhaust Other
Remedies, 25 SEATTLE U.L. REv. 677 (2002) (discussing a case where the state's highest
court held that tort claims of wrongful termination as a violation of public policy is in fact
available to all employees, at will or otherwise); J. Michael McGuinness, North Carolina's
Developing Public Policy Wrongful Discharge Doctrine in the New Millennium: Basic
Principles, Causation and Proof of Improper Motive, 23 CAMPBELL L. REv. 203 (2001)
(reviewing the development of the public policy doctrine in North Carolina's wrongful
termination cases).
5. See, e.g., Robert C. Bird, Rethinking Wrongful Discharge: A Continuum Approach,
73 U. CIN. L. REv. 517, 538-44 (2004) (examining trends in the tort of wrongful discharge
in violation public policy but ignoring the recognition of claims based on federal law).
6. See Part IV infra (discussing the potential for preemption).
7. Id. (noting, for example, the difficulty in Congress responding to state common law
judicial decisions that Congress believes are improper).
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II.

THE RECOGNITION OF FEDERAL LAW AS THE PUBLIC POLICY OF A
STATE

A.

The Claimfor Wrongful Discharge in Violation of Public PolicyBackground

625

There are several types of claims for wrongful discharge. 8 These
include claims based on an employer firing an employee in violation of
statutory provisions9 as well as claims based on the common law. to This
Article addresses the latter; specifically, claims for wrongful discharge in
violation of public policy. As its name suggests, a common law claim for
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy involves an employee who
is terminated by the employer, with the employee claiming that the
termination violates public policy. A common example of this type of
situation is the employer who fires an employee because the employee filed
a claim for workers' compensation. II
Because some workers'
compensation statutes do not expressly prohibit an employer from firing an
employee for filing a claim, courts have allowed employees to bring claims
for wrongful discharge under the theory that the workers' compensation
statute establishes a policy against employer retaliation. 12
As one might expect, a common question that arises is what
constitutes "public policy" such that a court will recognize a claim for
wrongful discharge. Courts have taken widely divergent positions with

8. See generally id. at 526 (characterizing wrongful discharge laws as existing on a
"structural continuum of conduct").
9. For example, firing an employee who complains about sex discrimination in the
workplace violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.
(2000).
10. See David L. Walsh & Joshua L. Schwartz, State Common Law WrongfUl
Discharge Doctrines: Up-date, Refinement, and Rationales, 33 AM. Bus. L.J. 645, 646 n.4
(1996) ("[T]hree primary common law doctrines have been used to challenge termination
decisions ... of employers: the public policy, implied contract, and covenant of good faith
and fair dealing doctrines.").
11. See Lawrence L. Summers, Wrongful Discharge: Contract, Public Policy, and Tort
Claims, PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course, Handbook Series, No. 663, at 75 (2001)
(providing a thorough list of cases which have recognized a public policy tort where an
employee is terminated for filing a worker's compensation claim).
12. See, e.g., Hansen v. Harrah's, 675 P.2d 394 (Nev. 1984) (reversing the lower
court's finding of a public policy exception to the at-will employment rule); Murphy v.
Topeka, 630 P.2d 186 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981) (reversing the lower court's dismissal of an
action against associated officers, but instructing that should the ex-employee prevail,
punitive damages should not be awarded); Frampton v. Cent. Indiana Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d
425 (Ind. 1973) (holding that a plaintiff alleging a wrongful retaliatiory termination due to
having filed a workers' compensation claim has stated a claim upon which relief can be
granted).
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regard to defining public policy.'3 Some limitations placed by courts
include requiring that the public policy be "clear and compelling,,,'4
"important and clearly articulated,,,15 or "involve[] a matter of public
concern.,,16 There is also variance among jurisdictions as to what the
sources of public policy can be. Some courts have limited the source of
public policy to that which is "articulated by constitutional, statutory, or
decisional law,,,'7 while others have broadened it to include "legislation;
administrative rules, regulations or decisions; and judicial decisions," as
well as "a professional code of ethics" in certain circumstances. 18
Even when courts have articulated such parameters, questions remain,
including that posed by this Article: How should courts treat federal law
when deciding whether it is the public policy of the state?

B.

Development of the Law in State Courts

In 1980, California became the first state to recognize federal law as
being the public policy of a state on which a wrongful discharge tort could
be based. '9 The California Supreme Court determined that the plaintiff had
stated a tort claim for wrongful discharge where he alleged that his
employer fired him for refusing to engage in price fixing in violation of
both federal law (the Sherman Antitrust ActiO and state law (the
Cartwright Act).21 The court, focused on whether a wrongful discharge
claim sounded in tort or contract, allowed the claim to go forward,
implicitly recognizing that federal law could provide a policy on which
state wrongful discharge claims could be based. 22 The court, however, did
not explicitly state this, nor provide guidance on what limitations, if any,
13. See Miriam A. Cherry, Whistling in the Dark? Corporate Fraud, Whistleblowers,
and the Implications of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act for Employment Law, 79 WASH. L. REv.
1029, 1045-46 (2004) (discussing the lack of unifonnity in state law regarding the public
policy exception).
14. Burk v. K-Mart Corp., 770 P.2d 24,29 (Ok. 1989).
15. Thibodeau v. Design Group One Architects, LLC, 802 A.2d 731,737 (Conn. 2002).
16. Edmondson v. Shearer Lumber Products, 75 P.3d 733,738 (Idaho 2003).
17. See, e.g., Burk, 770 P.2d at 28 (adopting this more limited approach in Oklahoma).
18. See, e.g., Pierce v. Ortho Phann. Corp., 417 A.2d 505,512 (N.J. 1980) (adopting
the broader approach in New Jersey). See also Clyde W. Summers, Individualism,
Collectivism and Autonomy in American Labor Law, 5 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'y J. 453, 462
(2001) (noting that "contrary to common judicial practices and the nature of the common
law, the courts generally insist that they cannot make public policy").
19. Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330 (Cal. 1980).
20. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (providing for penalties in monopolies and other restraints
of trade).
21. See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 16720 et seq. (providing for penalties for restraints of
trade in California).
22. See Tameny, 610 P.2d at 1335-37 (stating that employees cannot be rightfully
tenninated for refusing to commit criminal acts).
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would be placed on using federal law as the basis for a wrongful discharge
claim.23 Not having been explicitly addressed by the court, few scholars at
the time noted the potential expansion of the tort by allowing federal law to
articulate the public policy of a state.
The lack of substantive discussion in this initial recognition of federal
law as the basis for a claim was not unique. In Boyle v. Vista Eyewear,
Inc.,24 the Missouri Court of Appeals recognized a wrongful discharge
claim where the public policy relied upon by the plaintiff was found in
regulations promulgated by the federal Food and Drug Administration.
This recognition occurred without any substantive discussion of the use of
federal law as the basis for the claim; instead, the court merely stated that
"the federal regulation in question, 21 C.F.R. § 801.410, is a clear mandate
of public policy.,,25 The only justification the court provided for finding
that federal law was a mandate of public policy was that the federal Food
and Drug Administration was the agency charged with overseeing the
manufacture of eyeglasses, which was the business of the employer in the
case. 26 In summing up its decision, the court broadly articulated the rule of
what could be a source of public policy, noting that "[t]he employer is
bound to know the public policies of the state and nation as expressed in
their constitutions, statutes, judicial decisions and administrative
regulations .... ,,27
Other courts addressed the issue similarly. The Texas Supreme Court,
in a decision the same year as Boyle, also failed to discuss why federal law
could be the basis for a state law claim when it defined public policy as
being "the laws of this state and the United States which carry criminal
penalties.,,28 Similarly, the Supreme Court of Washington stated baldly that
"the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act [was] a clear expression of public
policy.,,29
This approach of unlimited acceptance of federal law as stating the
public policy of state would not last, and the first indications of a change in
approach came two years later, in Illinois. In Pratt v. Caterpillar Tractor
CO.,30 the Illinois appellate Court explicitly stated that federal law would
not always be considered a source of state public policy. Instead, the
federal law had to have some impact on the state's citizens; statutes that
articulated "exclusively Federal concerns," such as the Foreign Corrupt

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

See id.
700 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. App. 1985).
Id. at 876.
Id.
Id. at 877 (emphasis added).
Sabine Pilot Servo Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733, 735 (Tex. 1985).
Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081, 1090 (Wash. 1984).
500 N.E.2d 1001, 1003 (Ill. App. 1987).
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Practices Act and Export Administration Act, would not support a claim. 3l
A New Jersey appellate court reached a similar result in Cerracchio v.
Alden Leeds, Inc. 32 when it grappled with the question of whether a claim
for wrongful discharge would be recognized where the source of the public
policy was the federal Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA). The
court determined that OSHA could be the basis of the claim because "there
is a strong public policy in New Jersey favoring safety in the workplace.,,33
The court explained its decision by noting that the policy was stated in New
Jersey's own statutes. 34
However, courts did not rush to follow the analysis of Pratt or
Cerracchio. It was not until 1992, in Peterson v. Browning, that Utah
became the next state to question the acceptance of federal law as being
fungible with state law. 35 In response to a certified question from the U.S.
District Court for the District of Utah, the Utah Supreme Court held that
"[t]o provide the basis for an action under the public policy exception, a
violation of a state or federal law must contravene the clear and substantial
public policy of the state ofUtah.,,36 The court noted the existence of many
"ancient, anachronistic, and unenforced" federal laws, and thus declined to
wholesale adopt federal criminal law (as well as other states' laws) as
stating Utah's public policy?7 Instead, although it did not cite Pratt or
Cerracchio, it followed their approach in stating that federal law can serve
as the basis for a claim where the plaintiff alleges an employer violates a
federal law, and the violation "contravenes the clear and substantial public
policies of the state ofUtah.,,38
Up to the time of Pratt and Cerracchio, then, courts had simply been
treating federal law as fungible with state law in analyzing wrongful
discharges in violation of public policy claims. 39 Published decisions did
not even articulate the question of whether federal law and state law should

31. Id.
32. 538 A.2d 1292 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988).
33. Id. at 1298.
34. Id.
35. 832 P.2d 1280 (Utah 1992).
36. Id. at 1283.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See, e.g., Cloutier v. Great At!. & Pac. Tea Co., Inc., 436 A.2d 1140, 1145 (N.H.
1981) (holding that the public policy of protecting employees from harm existed "with or
without OSHA"). This is not to suggest that courts had been blindly accepting any federal
statute as the basis for a claim. Rather, courts were conducting their standard analysis as to
whether the laws in question were of a type that stated public policy without focusing on the
fact that the laws were federal, not state. See, e.g., Montoya v. Local Union III of Int'l Bhd.
of E1ec. Workers, 755 P.2d 1221 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that OSHA did not provide
a basis for a public policy claim, in part because the statute was too broad and general in
nature).
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be treated the same. Even after Pratt, many courts still did not focus on
whether federal law should be treated the same as state law as a basis for
public policy.40 As late as 1992, when Peterson was decided, many courts
were engaging in a cursory discussion of whether federal law should be
treated the same as state law. 41
In addition to Illinois and Utah, Ohio, Washington, North Carolina,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Kansas have all articulated limitations on
when federal law can be the public policy ofa state. 42 While some of these
jurisdictions have explicitly outlined the requirements of proving that
federal law is a state's public policy,43 others have not stated what would be
required but suggested that merely citing federal law would not be
enough.44 For example, in Ohio, the approach seems similar to that of Utah
but lacks the explicit statement of the rule. 45 In Kulch, the court recognized
OSHA's anti-retaliation provision as being public policy, noting that
"Ohio's public policy is clearly in keeping with the laudable objectives of

40. See, e.g., Martin Marietta Corp. v. Lorenz, 823 P.2d 100 (Colo. 1992) (finding that
18 U.S.C. § 1001 supported a claim for wrongful discharge, yet not addressing whether the
analysis for federal statutes differs from that for state statutes); Luethans v. Washington
Univ., 838 S. W.2d 117, 120 (Mo. 1992) (holding that the employee stated a claim for
wrongful discharge based on the federal Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2143, and 9 C.F.R.
§ 2.32(c)(4)); Petersimes v. Crane Co., 835 S.W.2d 514, 517 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (holding
that employee stated a claim for wrongful discharge based on 18 U.S.c. § 1001).
41. See Sargent v. Cent. Nat'l Bank. & Trust Co. of Enid, 809 P.2d 1298, 1300-01
(Okla. 1991) (finding that the employee stated a wrongful discharge claim where he
articulated several state statutes as well as 18 U.S.C. § 1005 as stating public policy);
Coman v. Thomas Mfg. Co., 381 S.E.2d 445 (N.c. 1989) (allowing a claim where the
plaintiff cited U.S. Department of Transportation regulations as the source of public policy);
see also Smuck v. Nat'l Mgmt. Corp., 540 N.W.2d 669 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995) (holding that,
at least on first impression, violation of federal law may serve as public policy exemption in
the context of wrongful termination).
42. Hysten v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry., 85 P.3d 1183 (Kan. 2004); Kulch v.
Structural Fibers, Inc., 677 N.E.2d 308 (Ohio 1997); Sedlacek v. Hillis, 36 P.3d 1014
(Wash. 2001); McLaughlin v. Gastrointestinal Specialists, Inc., 750 A.2d 283, 288 (Pa.
2000); Griffin v. Mullinix, 947 P.2d 177 (Okla. 1997).
43. See Sedlacek, 36 P.3d at 1021 (holding that the ADA cannot serve as the state's
public policy because there is a Washington statute addressing disability discrimination, and
the employee's claims are not prohibited by the Washington statute); McLaughlin, 750 A.2d
at 288 (finding that federal regulations cannot support a wrongful discharge claim "unless of
course the employee is able to articulate a particular policy within the Commonwealth that
is threatened"); Griffin, 947 P.2d at 179 ("[A] federal statute cannot serve as an articulation
of Oklahoma public policy, absent a specific Oklahoma decision, statute or constitutional
provision. ").
44. See Hysten, 85 P.3d at 1187 (finding, without establishing a test going forward, that
the Federal Employers Liability Act stated Kansas public policy, based in part on the fact
that its policy is "identical" to the policy embodied in the Kansas Workers Compensation
Act).
45. Kulch, 677 N.E.2d 308 (1997).
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the federal Occupational Safety and Health Act. ,.46 This language used by
the court in reaching its decision suggests that some link between federal
law and state policy would be required for the federal law to serve as the
state's public policy.
On the other hand, other courts have been far less exacting, not
requiring a link between federal law and state public policy. For example,
Iowa's first decision on the issue, which was after Pratt and Cerracchio,
reflects a more inclusive approach toward federal law as being a source of
public policy than does Peterson. In Smuck v. National Management
Corp. ,47 the court ultimately held that federal law could serve as the state's
public policy, reaching its decision by citing to cases which, without
discussion, had already recognized federal law based wrongful discharge
c1aims. 48 The court also noted that its decision was grounded in its belief
that "state and federal law need not be mutually exclusive," and that "[a]ny
other finding would leave many employees with the difficult decision of
either breaking federal law or losing their jobs.'.49 Unlike the Cerracchio
and Peterson formulations, which required linkage of federal law to a state
policy, Smuck did not create any limitations on its decision. 50 Going one
step beyond Smuck, in 1997, Connecticut's Supreme Court explicitly
decided that no link was required between a federal statute and state public
policy in order to state a claim for wrongful discharge based on a federal
criminal statute. 51 In reaching its decision, the court noted that "[w]e
perceive no difference between a situation in which an employee is forced
to engage in conduct that may expose him to federal criminal sanctions and
a situation in which an employee is forced to engage in conduct that may
46. Id. at 322.
47. 540 N.W.2d 669 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995).
48. See id. at 672 ("Although Iowa has not yet identified federal law standing alone as a
source of public policy in wrongful termination cases, several other states have adopted
federal law as state policy.").
49. Id. at 672-73.
50. See id. (holding that federal law can serve as an appropriate source for state policy).
Interestingly, when the issue finally made it to the New Jersey Supreme Court, that court
failed to use the Cerracchio approach, or even note it. D'Agostino v. Johnson & Johnson,
Inc., 628 A.2d 305 (N.J. 1993). Instead, the court engaged in an analysis somewhat similar
to that of the court in Smuck, listing numerous cases where federal statutes had been found
to be sources of public policy, and citing approvingly the analysis of other jurisdictions,
without ever expressly identifying what factors courts should consider in determining
whether federal law is state public policy. See id. at 529-31 (determining that the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act is a valid source of state policy by virtue of the Supremacy Clause and
the federal government's plenary authority over foreign affairs). Wisconsin has also
followed a similar approach to Smuck. See Strozinsky v. Sch. Dist. of Brown Deer, 614
N.W.2d 443, 458 (Wisc. 2000) (avoiding an express requirement that federal law be linked
to a state statute or policy, but noting in its decision that "Wisconsin has an interest in
compliance with federal tax laws").
51. Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., 693 A.2d 293,297 (Conn. 1997).
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expose him to state criminal sanctions.,,52
As the two approaches discussed above were being developed, a third
approach surfaced. The final approach taken in this issue is that federal
law cannot be a source of public policy. To date, no state supreme court
has affirmatively held that federal law can never be the source of public
policy. However, Virginia courts have stated that it is that state's law, not
federal law, which is the source of public policy, and implied that federal
law will not be recognized as a source of public policy.53
The development of this area of law has been anything but linear.
Even as these explorations into whether federal and state law would be
treated the same for the public policy exception were occurring, some state
courts still seemed not to have identified, failing to mention any concern
about federal law as a source of public policy.54
The reason for the development of the three approaches outlined
above may in part be the result of whether the discharged employee was
being asked to violate federal law by his employer. In such circumstances,
such as in Smuck and Faulkner, courts have been more likely to recognize
federal law as stating public policy without requiring any link to state law. 55
Washington recognized this distinction in its own cases, and in Sedlacek v.
Hillis, clarified that a link between state and federal law would be required
where there is "no violation or potential violation of an enforceable law.,,56
However, this does not explain cases where the employee was asked to
violate federal law yet the courts refused to adopt a broad rule recognizing
federal law as a source of public policy without a link to state law. 57

52. Id. at 296.
53. See Lawrence Chrysler Plymouth Corp. v. Brooks, 465 S.E.2d 806 (Va. 1996)
(refusing to allow a claim where the plaintiff had failed to identify "specific Virginia
statutes" which were the source of public policy). See also Oakley v. May Dep't Stores Co.,
17 F. Supp. 2d 533, 536 (E.D. Va. 1998) (noting that Virginia does not appear to recognize
federal law as a source of public policy).
54. See, e.g., Holmes v. General Dynamics Corp., 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 172 (Cal. Ct. App.
1993) (holding that a violation of the False Statements Act significantly implicates a
substantial public policy); see also Magee v. DanSources Technical Serv., Inc., 769 A.2d
231 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2001) (holding that 18 U.S.c. § 24 and § 1347 provide a source of
public policy); Lynch v. Blanke Baer & Bowey Krimko, Inc., 901 S.W.2d 147 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1995) (holding that wrongful discharge violative of a federal regulation can give rise
to a narrow public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine); Banaitis v.
Mitsubishi Bank, Ltd., 879 P.2d 1288 (Or. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that federal and state
statutes, bank rules, and common law principles protecting customer information against
disclosure by banks served as basis for public policy claim).
55. See Faulkner, 693 A.2d at 296 (employee alleged that he was discharged for
refusing to violate 18 U.S.C. § 1031); Smuck, 540 N.W.2d at 672-73 (employee alleged that
he was discharged for refusing to violate 18 U.S.C. § 1001).
56. Sedlacek, 36 P.3d at 1021.
57. See, e.g., Peterson v. Browning, 832 P.2d 1280 (Utah 1992) (requiring a link where
employee claimed to be terminated for refusing to engage in the unlawful act of falsifying
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In sum, then, there are three main approaches that state courts have
taken in analyzing wrongful discharge claims where the public policy
source is federal law. Some states have required that there be some link
between federal law and state public policy for the claim to succeed. Other
states have expressly declined to require such a link, placing federal law on
the same footing as state law. Similarly, some states have not clearly
addressed the issue, and it appears from the lack of discussion that federal
law may well be treated the same as state law in determining whether it can
be the basis for a wrongful discharge claim. On the other extreme, some
courts have refused to allow any federal law to be the source of a wrongful
discharge claim.

C.

Development of the Law in Federal Courts

Because the federal courts are required to follow the lead of the state
courts on this issue, one might posit they would be more sensitive than
state courts to the need to determine whether federal law could articulate
the state's public policy. However, federal courts were even less attuned
than state courts to the possibility that states might not wholesale adopt
federal law as comparable to their own laws for public policy purposes.
Like state courts, for years most federal courts that addressed the issue
failed to clearly address whether federal law is fungible with state law in
claims for to wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.58 There was,
however, one early case that did analyze the issue. In 1982, the U.S.
District Court for the District of Maryland became the first federal court to
determine whether federal law could serve as the state's public policy.59 In
Adler v. American Standard Corp., the court held that an employee stated a
claim for wrongful discharge based on the employer's alleged violation of
federal tax laws. 60 While not explicitly establishing a test to determine
when federal law articulates the state's public policy, the court focused on
tax documents).
58. See, e.g., Norris v. Cumberman's Mut. Cas. Co., 881 F.2d 1144 (1st Cir. 1989)
(allowing wrongful discharge claim under Massachusetts law based on the Energy
Reorganization Act); Radwan v. Beecham Laboratories, 850 F.2d 147 (3d Cir. 1988)
(opining that the state supreme court would recognize a public policy even though it was
based on federal law, but recognizing that the termination violated state public policy
anyway).
59. See Adler v. Am. Standard Corp., 538 F. Supp. 572 (D. Md. 1982) (holding that
under Maryland law, federal law may be the source of public policy). One other federal
court had previously allowed a claim based on federal law but did not directly address under
what conditions federal law should be allowed to be the source of public policy for a
wrongful discharge claim. See McNulty v. Borden, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 1111 (E.D. Pa. 1979)
(recognizing the Clayton Act as a basis for a state claim of wrongful discharge arising from
alleged antitrust violations).
60. Adler, 538 F. Supp. at 580.
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two key points: (1) not to allow federal law to be Maryland's public policy
would result in "the State of Maryland [closing] its eyes and, as a matter of
policy, not [being] concerned with violations of federal law";61 and (2)
because Maryland tax returns are heavily based on federal tax returns,
Maryland would be harmed by federal tax evasion. 62 The second point
raised by the court in Adler is the first hint at the test ultimately expressed
in Pratt, Cerracchio, and Peterson: that the federal law must be linked to
some state interest or policy.
Even though Adler identified the issue clearly and began the process
of establishing the standards for when federal law articulates the public
policy of the state, it was years before other federal courts addressed the
issue directly. Like many state courts, some federal courts appeared to
assume that federal law was fungible with state law. 63 Meanwhile, other
federal courts grappled with the related question of whether the state
wrongful discharge claim was preempted by the federal statute that the
plaintiff identified as being one of, if not the, source of public policy.64
And, on occasion, some courts addressed preemption explicitly while still
failing to articulate standards for when federal law could serve as the public
policy of the state. 65
Interestingly, it took federal courts longer than state courts to realize
that states might not simply want to treat federal and state law as fungible
6l. Id. at 579.

62. See id. at 580 (noting the adverse effect of federal tax evasion on the state of
Maryland).
63. See, e.g., Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1983) (holding that
the plaintiff stated a claim under Pennsylvania law for wrongful discharge, based on the
public policy articulated in both the federal and state constitutional provisions protecting
freedom of association); Buttell v. Am. Podiatric Medical Ass'n, 700 F. Supp. 592 (D.D.C.
1988) (allowing wrongful discharge claim under District of Columbia law, based on the
public policy articulated in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Sherman v. St.
Barnabas Hosp., 535 F. Supp. 564 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (holding that the plaintiff stated a claim
under New York law for wrongful discharge, based on the public policy articulated in the
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)). But see Rachford v. Evergreen
Intern. Airlines, Inc., 596 F. Supp. 384, 385 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (refusing to allow claim based
on federal law).
64. See, e.g., Norris v. Lumberman's Mutual Cas. Co., 881 F.2d 1144 (1st Cir. 1989)
(holding that the Energy Reorganization Act does not preempt a state claim for wrongful
discharge in violation of public policy); Authier v. Ginsberg, 757 F.2d 796 (6th Cir. 1985)
(finding that ERISA preempts state wrongful discharge in violation of public policy claim);
Cancellier v. Federated Dept. Stores, 672 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act does not preempt state wrongful discharge in violation
of public policy claim).
65. See Hines v. Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc., 813 F. Supp. 550 (W.D. Ky. 1993) (holding
that OSHA can serve as public policy of Kentucky, but that it preempts a state wrongful
discharge claim); Sorge v. Wright's Knitwear Corp. 832 F. Supp. 118 (E.D. Pa. 1993)
(holding that federal law (OSHA) can serve as public policy of Pennsylvania, and that
OSHA does not preempt a state claim for wrongful discharge).
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in terms of whether federal law could serve as the public policy of the
state. 66 While the Adler court recognized in 1982 that there might be a
question of when federal law could serve as the public policy of a state,
only a handful of federal courts even acknowledged this concern in the
decade following Adler. 67 It was years later when a few federal courts
decided that federal law was not fungible with state law, and these courts
reached their decisions because there were strong indications in the state
supreme court's prior decisions that the court would limit public policy
sources to state law. 68 These cases were not circumstances of federal courts
conducting an independent, first impression analysis of whether it would .be
proper for federal law to serve as state public policy. Rather, they were
courts bound to follow the analysis that the state courts previously had
established, or where the state's analysis was not clearly established, there
were at least hints that the state would not treat federal law the same as
state law in determining whether the public policy exception would apply. 69
Despite federal courts' apparent initial assurance that states would
wholesale adopt federal law as the public policy of the states, after state
courts began indicating that there were limits on the use of federal law to
support wrongful discharge claims, federal courts slowly began recognizing
66. While some states articulated concern over this issue as early as 1987, federal courts
were not acknowledging this concern even into the 1990s. Compare Pratt v. Caterpillar
Tractor Co., 506 N.E.2d 959, 959 (Ill. App. 1987) (allowing leave to appeal in order to
determine "the extent to which statements of public policy by the federal government are
cognizable in State courts and protected by civil actions for retaliatory discharge") with
Hanson v. Gichner Systems Group, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 403 (M.D. Pa. 1993) (noting that
federalism imposes duties on states to respect federal law, and that it is in states' citizens'
interests to enforce federal law), and Hutson v. Analytic Scis. Corp., 860 F. Supp. 6 (D.
Mass. 1994) (holding that a wrongful discharge claim can be based solely on federal law,
and noting a "lack of contrary authority" to the proposition).
67. See Hanson, 831 F. Supp. 403, 406 (allowing claims based on federal law despite
employer's assertion that only Pennsylvania law could be source of public policy, and
noting that the doctrine of federalism imposes some duties on the states); Hutson, 860 F.
Supp. 6 (analyzing cases that allowed federal law to be the source of public policy and
concluding that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court would "approve consideration of
federal law as a potential source" of public policy).
68. See McKenzie v. Renberg's, Inc., 94 F.3d 1478, 1487 (lOth Cir. 1996) (stating that
the plaintiff could prevail only by showing that Oklahoma had "a clearly established public
policy regarding maximum work hours and overtime pay"); see also Richmond v. Oneok,
Inc., 120 F.3d 205, 210 (10th Cir. 1997) (citing McKenzie, but not Oklahoma court
decisions, as the basis for its decision); McCarthy v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 999 F. Supp.
823,829 (E.D. Va. 1998) (limiting the source of state public policy to state statutes); Oakley
v. May Dept. Stores Co., 17 F. Supp. 2d 533,535-36 (E.D. Va. 1998) (holding that Virginia
law does not recognize Title VII as a basis for wrongful discharge claims).
69. For example, in Buser v. Southern Food Service, Inc., the court determined that a
wrongful discharge claim could not be based on the FMLA because North Carolina did not
have a statute expressing North Carolina's policy on family and medical leave and also
because prior state cases had used language suggesting that public policy must be found in
state statutes. 73 F. Supp. 2d 556, 566-68 (M.D.N.C. 1999).
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this concern. 70 Szaller v. American National Red Cros/ I illustrates this
shift in the federal courts. There, the court refused to allow a wrongful
discharge claim under Maryland law based on federal regulations. The
court based its decision on a concern that allowing federal regulations to be
considered Maryland's public policy would greatly expand a state-based
tort exception to the employment at will doctrine; the court felt that only a
Maryland state court should make the decision to expand the reach of the
tort.72 The Szaller court was unique in its discussion of the potential impact
on state law-this concern was not raised by federal courts prior to this
decision and has only been raised infrequently since the decision. 73
Overall, state and federal courts have been on parallel paths in the
development of the law regarding whether federal law can be the basis for a
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy claim. Federal courts have
been quicker than state courts to identify the potential preemption issues
involved in basing claims on federal law. However, federal courts have
lagged behind state courts in recognizing limitations on the use of federal
law in these claims.

70. See, e.g., Szaller v. Am. Nat'l Red Cross, 293 F.3d 148, 151 (4th Cir. 2002)
("Although federal law can preempt state law under the Supremacy Clause, this in no way
implies that federal law automatically defmes state policy, or that federal agencies can
determine its parameters."); Simas v. First Citizens' Fed. Credit Union, 63 F. Supp. 2d 110
(D. Mass. 1999) (noting that not all federal law serves as the public policy of Massachusetts;
rather, that the federal law must concern or involve Massachusetts' public policy to be the
basis of a wrongful discharge claim). Simas is particularly fascinating because the court
cites to Hutson for this proposition, despite the fact that the Hutson court appeared to
embrace a far more generous role for federal law-a presumption that if the federal law
articulated federal policy on which there was no state policy equivalent (for example,
nuclear regulation), then federal law could be state policy. But see Lau v. Behr Heat
Transfer Systems, Inc., 150 F. Supp. 2d 1017 (D.S.D. 2001) (deciding, under South Dakota
law, that the FMLA is analogous to the state worker's compensation statutes, and therefore
allowing a claim for wrongful termination based solely on the FMLA); Schatzman v. Martin
Newark Dealership, Inc., 158 F. Supp. 2d 392 (D. Del. 2001) (allowing a wrongful
discharge claim based on Title VII without discussing whether federal law can be the source
of public policy).
71. 293 F.3d 148 (4th Cir. 2002).
72. See id. at 152 (denouncing the possibility of a federal court imposing "the entire
Code of Federal Regulations on every Maryland employer").
73. See id. (reasoning that the narrow wrongful discharge exception is not intended to
supplant federalism); see also Howell v. Operations Mgmt. Int'l, Inc., 77 Fed. Appx. 248,
252 (5th Cir. 2003) (fearing that allowing claim based on violations of OSHA regulations
would create "a significant change in Mississippi labor law" because of the potentially huge
number of federal regulations that apply to employers).
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III. DEFICIENCIES IN THE THREE MAIN APPROACHES TO FEDERAL LAW AS
A SOURCE OF PUBLIC POLICY

As noted above, some states do allow wrongful discharge claims to be
brought based on federal law, without any requirement that the plaintiff
prove that federal law is consistent with the public policy of the state. 74
This position was to a large extent the default rule that courts operated
under for years. In addition to courts assuming that federal law could serve
as the public policy of the state, legal scholars did as well. 75 As courts
began to reconsider whether federal law could be used to support state law
wrongful discharge claims, some legal scholars began to note this.76
However, most legal scholars focused on developing a framework for
analyzing public policy claims generally, and in this process, paid little
attention to the specific issue of relying on federal law as the source of
public policy.77 To date, legal scholars have not substantively evaluated the
different approaches used by courts.
There are three main approaches that courts have taken in determining
to what extent federal law can be the basis of a claim for wrongful
discharge in violation of public policy: (1) treating federal law the same as
state law in evaluating whether it can serve as the state's public policy; (2)
requiring the plaintiff to establish some link between federal law and the
state's public policy in order to base the claim on federal law; and (3)
74. See supra notes 37~2 and accompanying text.
75. See, e.g., Thomas L. Cluff, Jr., Comment, In Defense of a Narrow Public Policy
Exception of the Employment At Will Rule, 16 MISS. c.L. REv. 437 (1996) (equating federal
and state law as sources of public policy, without discussion); Frank J. Cavico, Employment
At Will and Public Policy, 25 AKRON L. REv. 497, 507-18 (1992) (discussing the sources of
public policy without distinguishing between federal and state sources); Elleta Sangrey
Callahan, The Public Policy Exception to the Employment At Will Rule Comes of Age: A
Proposed Framework, 29 AM. Bus. L.J. 481, 490-94 (1991) (explaining the sources of
public policy without distinguishing between federal and state law); John E. Gardner,
Federal Labor Law Preemption of State Wrongful Discharge Claims, 58 U. CIN. L. REv.
491 (1989) (assuming, without discussion, that states would find that the NLRA could be
the public policy supporting a wrongful discharge claim.
76. See, e.g., Robert B. Fitzpatrick, Vox Populi: The Public Policy Tort in the
Workplace, 17th Annual ALI-ABA Course of Study, Dec. 2-4, 2004, SK033 ALI-ABA 765
(noting that the public policy exception can include federal law in some state as a source of
public policy); Michael D. Moberly, Begging the Federal Question: Removal Jurisdiction
in Wrongful Discharge Claims, 20 SEATTLE U.L. REv. 81, 87 (1996) (claiming that "the
better view is that at least some federal expressions of public policy" support a wrongful
discharge claim).
77. See Deborah A. Ballam, Employment-At-Will: The Impending Death of a Doctrine,
37 AM. Bus. LJ. 653 (2000) (discussing the possibility of the employment at will doctrine
eroding because of the public policy exception); Callahan, supra note 75, at 490-504
(proposing a four-element test for public policy claims). See also Moberly, supra note 76
(raising the issue whether a state law claim based on an alleged violation of federal law
necessarily invokes federal question jurisdiction).
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refusing to allow federal law to be the source of public policy. 78 Part II of
this Article described the historical development of these approaches, and
Part III will examine each approach, including the justifications provided
by the courts, in detail.

A.

Treating Federal and State Law in an Identical Manner

Commonly used rationales for treating federal law the same as state
law as a source of public policy specifically, by not requiring some express
link between federal and state law, include the following: (1) other courts
have allowed use of federal law without a link; 79 (2) the Supremacy Clause
indicates that federal law should be given equal force to state law;80 (3)
states have an interest in promoting compliance with federallaw;81 and (4)
not allowing equal status would force employees to make the unpalatable
choice of either violating federal law or keeping their jobs. 82
As to the first rationale, the fact that there are cases where courts
allowed claims based on federal law to go forward does not, in and of
itself, provide sound analytical support for this approach. As noted in Part
II, many courts did not initially consider the question of whether federal
law could serve as the state's public policy. It took years for the issue of
federal law supplying the public policy in a wrongful discharge claim to be
recognized and addressed, and once addressed, courts have been split on
whether to continue to assume that federal law is a source of state public
policy for wrongful discharge claims. 83 This, then, does not provide a
sound analytical basis for continuing to treat federal law the same as state
law in analyzing whether it is the public policy of the state.
The second rationale was articulated clearly in Brandon v. Anesthesia

78. See Part II.A., supra.
79. See, e.g., Faulkner v. United Tech. Corp., 693 A.2d 293, 297-98 (Conn. 1997)
(holding that neither violation of state public policy, nor explicit connection between state
policy and federal statute, is necessary to establish a cause of action and noting that "[w]e
find support for our conclusion in the decision of the courts of many other jurisdictions");
D'Agostino v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc., 628 A.2d 305, 312-14 (N.J. 1993) (affirming the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act as a source of state public policy, for purposes of a wrongful
discharge claim).
80. See, e.g., D'Agostino, 628 A.2d at 313 (citing approvingly the dissent in Pratt v.
Caterpillar Tractor Co., 506 N.E.2d 959,959 (Ill. 1997) where Justice Simon relied on the
Supremacy Clause to support his position).
81. See, e.g., Adler v. Am. Standard Corp., 538 F. Supp. 572, 578-79 (D. Md. 1982)
(holding that incorporating federal public policy into state law is consistent with state
sovereignty).
82. See, e.g., Faulkner, 693 A.2d at 296 (noting that "the effect on the employee of
being forced to choose between violating the law or facing discharge by his employer is the
same regardless of which sovereign criminalizes the conduct").
83. See Part II.A, supra.
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& Pain Management Associates,84 where the court noted that "under the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, the state is required to
treat federal law on a parity with state law, and thus it is not entitled to
relegate violations of federal law or policy to second-class citizenship.,,85
Under this theory, states must treat federal law as a source of public policy
as they do state law. There is, however, a significant flaw with this theory.
The Supremacy Clause only requires that states abide by and follow federal
laws, not that they adopt the policy behind federal law as a potential
exception to employment at will. 86 For example, the Supremacy Clause
requires state courts to enforce the Family and Medical Leave Act;
however, it does not require that the state implement its own, additional
remedies for violations of the FMLA. Requiring states to treat federal law
as an equal source of public policy would in fact create that result, by
giving employees remedies not provided by the federal law. Under the
Supremacy Clause, all that the state is required to do is enforce federal law
as it is written, not create new remedies based on federal law simply
because a state has chosen to create some wrongful discharge remedies
based on state law.
The weakness in this position is seen even more clearly in the
following example: suppose a state were to enact legislation providing an
employee with a claim for wrongful termination if the employer fired the
employee for refusing to violate certain enumerated state statutes. The
Supremacy Clause would not require, and certainly no court would require,
that the state include federal laws in that list. It would be entirely up to the
state what laws the list would contain. The result is no different when the
claim is a common law claim. Essentially, state courts are in the process of
creating a list like that indicated in this example. It no more follows that
state courts must add federal law to that list than it would were the state
legislature to create the list. Clearly, the Supremacy Clause does not
require that federal law be included in the state's sources of public policy.
The third rationale for treating federal law the same as state law, that
states have an interest in promoting the enforcement of federal law, would
appear to be analytically sound. The theory is that by punishing employers
(via awarding damages to employees) for breaking federal law, the states
create incentives for employers to abide by federal laws. Facially, at least,
it appears accurate-what state would say that it does not have such an
interest?87 The problem is that, while states may have an interest in

84. 277 F.3d 936, 942 (7th Cir. 2002).
85. Id. (citations omitted).
86. See Szaller v. Am. Nat'l Red Cross, 293 F.3d 148, 151-52 (4th Cir. 2002) (stating
that federal law does not define state policy).
87. But cf Rachford v. Evergreen Int'I Airlines, Inc., 596 F. Supp. 385, 385-86 (N.D.
Ill. 1984) (dismissing the plaintiff's wrongful discharge claim because it was based on FAA
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enforcing federal law by providing remedies that the federal government
has not opted to provide, in using the federal law as a source of public
policy for a wrongful discharge claim, states go beyond mere enforcement
of the law and create remedies not intended by Congress. The potential
result of this is to substantially alter the balance of interests that Congress
created in the underlying federal law. 88
A second problem with the idea that states should treat federal law as
they do state law is the difficulty of correcting state court decisions with
which Congress disagrees. While states can alter the results of state court
decisions that are seen as being particularly problematic,89 this type of
action is not always possible by Congress. First, it would require Congress
to monitor thousands of state court decisions to see what federal laws were
being used as sources of public policy and determine whether any of the
decisions were inconsistent with that federal law. Second, it would be
difficult, if not impossible, for Congress to legislatively overrule these
decisions. Unlike state legislatures, which can amend state law and
exclude a particular kind of state law claim, Congress cannot reach to the
state level and overrule a state's determination that a federal statute is a
source of public policy.90 Instead, it is likely that the only real option
would be for Congress to attempt to preempt the state law by amending the
federal law to expressly prohibit state tort actions based on the law. Putting
to one side the potential political repercussions of such action, even if
Congress amended federal law, there are potential constitutional problems
with this approach. 91

regulations rather than state law, and subsequently noting that Illinois "has no interest in
enforcing federal law").
88. For instance, when Congress created Title VII, it exempted from its purview
employers with few employees. Thus, employees of small employers who were retaliated
against for opposing their employer's discriminatory actions were not protected against
discharge. However, when a state uses the policies in Title VII as the basis for a wrongful
discharge claim, the state in fact subjects the small employer to potentially greater damages
than larger employers covered by Title VII because Title VII contains a damages cap. This
result is inconsistent with the congressional intent not to require small employers to comply
with Title VII.
89. For example, in Lockhart v. Commonw. Educ. Sys. Corp., 439 S.E.2d 328 (Va.
1994), the Virginia Supreme Court recognized a common law action for racial
discrimination in employment based on the Virginia Human Rights Act. The Virginia
legislature responded the next year by amending the Act to preclude such a claim.
90. Cj ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES, § 3.9
(2d ed.) (2002) (noting that the Supreme Court has resurrected the Tenth Amendment as a
tool to protect state sovereignty from federal intrusion).
91. See Bradford R. Clark, The Supremacy Clause as a Constraint on Federal Power,
71 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 91 (2003) (discussing the requirement that federal law must be
constitutionally valid in order to preempt state law under the Supremacy Clause). This
potential problem is likely to arise where states retain extensive power to legislate/regulate.
See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977) ("Where, as here, the field which
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The fourth rationale posited by courts in support of treating federal
law the same as state law as a source of public policy is that if federal law
is not a source of public policy, employees would be faced with the
difficult decision of whether to violate federal law or refuse and potentially
lose their jobs.92 This rationale seems particularly compelling because it
appears to present a perfect Catch-22 situation if federal law is not treated
the same as state law. However, despite its appeal, there is one weakness
with this rationale. Under many of the statutes identified by employees as
a source of public policy, there is no possibility whatsoever that the
employee would be violating federal law. 93 The argument must then
become more complex to be valid: employees should not be faced with a
choice between helping their employers violate federal law or refusing and
potentially losing their jobs.
While the impetus behind the rationale is lessened in this reworking of
the argument because it recognizes that the employee may not be at risk of
being prosecuted or held liable for his actions, it does suggest a valid
reason for treating federal law similar to state law. Employees should not
be engaging in actions that promote the violation of law. However, the
countervailing concerns noted above, particularly the difficulty of
"correcting" decisions that do not align with what Congress intended,
suggest that caution, rather than wholesale adoption of federal law as a
source of public policy, is appropriate. And, as discussed in Part III.C
infra, there are other substantive reasons courts have noted for limiting the

Congress is said to have pre-empted has been traditionally occupied by the States ... 'we
start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be
superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress. "') (citations omitted).
92. Cf Coman v. Thomas Mfg. Co., 381 S.E.2d 445, 447 (N.c. 1989) ("Plaintiff
allegedly was faced with the dilemma of violating that public policy and risking
imprisonment, or complying with that public policy and being fired from his employment.")
(citation omitted); Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 427 A.2d 385,388 (Conn. 1980)
(noting that if the plaintiff had not complained to his employer about the employer's
repeated violations of state food and drug laws, he might have been exposed to the
"possibility of criminal prosecution").
93. Under OSHA, a frequently cited statute in support of wrongful discharge claims,
individual employees are not criminally liable for OSHA violations, or subject to civil
penalties, except in very rare circumstances, such as when the employee is in fact a sole
proprietor of the business. See, e.g., United States v. Shear, 962 F.2d 488 (5th Cir. 1992)
(finding employees not criminally liable); At!. & Gulf Stevedores v. Occupational Safety &
Health Review Comm'n, 534 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1976) (finding employees not civilly liable).
Title VII also provides an example of this. If an employer ordered an employee to call a coworker racist names, the individual employee would not be held liable for violating Title
VII; however, his employer might be. See, e.g., Williams v. Banning, 72 F.3d 552 (7th Cir.
1995) (finding no individual liability for supervisors under Title VII); EEOC COMPLIANCE
MANUAL § 2-III.B.2.b. (noting that the majority of federal appeals courts have held that
supervisors are not liable under Title VII).

2006] THE USE OF FEDERAL LAW AS A SOURCE OF PUBLIC POLICY

641

use of federal public policies to those that have a connection to the state
and its public policies which must be weighed against this interest to
determine what the proper approach should be.

B.

Requiring Some Link Between Federal Law and State Public Policy

Some of the early cases that suggested or explicitly required that there
be a link between federal law and state public policy for the federal law to
be the source of public policy for a claim for wrongful discharge failed to
explain why such a link would be required. 94 Later cases have provided
some rationales for this approach: (1) there are many federal laws that may
be outdated, or not enforced, and violations of such laws would not violate
the public policy of the state;95 (2) at times, federal law supports a broad
policy that goes beyond what the state desires;96 (3) the state legislature, not
Congress, is the body vested with the power to articulate public policy for
the state;97 and (4) allowing federal law to articulate state public policy will
create so many exceptions to the employment at will doctrine that the
exceptions will swallow the rule. 98
As to the first rationale, while it may be accurate that there are
numerous outdated and/or unenforced federal laws, the same could also be
said for state laws. Indeed, this fact was recognized in the very case that
provided this rationale. 99 Furthermore, if the statute were outdated or not
enforced, even if it were treated the same as state law, it would likely fail to
pass the requirements of being a "substantial" public policy and would not
support a wrongful discharge action. loo Thus, this rationale fails as a basis
94. See Cerracchio v. Alden Leeds, Inc., 538 A.2d 1292, 1298-99 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1988) (holding that employees in New Jersey could maintain private actions in tort or
contract for retaliatory discharge "as a result of the filing of an OSHA complaint because
such discharge contravenes our public policy," but failing to explain why the initial basis for
the link requirement); Pratt v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 500 N.E.2d 1001, 1003 (Ill. App. Ct.
1986) ("The common theme of our courts' decisions sustaining a plaintiffs cause of action
for retaliatory discharge is there must be a State public policy at issue.").
95. See Peterson v. Browning, 832 P.2d 1280, 1283 (Utah 1992) (stating that violations
of outdated laws would not necessarily violate Utah public policy).
96. See Sedlacek v. Hillis, 36 P.3d 1014, 1020--21 (Wash. 2001) (holding that the ADA
does not provide a mandate of Washington public policy when it conflicts with state law).
97. See Griffin v. Mullinix, 947 P.2d 177, 179 (Okla. 1997) (stating that the Oklahoma
state legislature, not Congress, declares Oklahoma public policy).
98. See McLaughlin v. Gastrointestinal Specialists, Inc. 750 A.2d 283, 290 (Pa. 2000)
("If it becomes the law that an employee may bring a wrongful discharge claim pursuant to
the 'public policy' exception ... merely by restating a private cause of action for the
violation of some federal regulation, the exception would soon swallow the rule.").
99. See Peterson, 832 P.2d at 1283 (stating that outdated state laws exist).
100. A policy is "substantial" ifit is of "overreaching importance to the public." Ryan v.
Dan's Food Stores, Inc., 972 P.2d 395, 405 (Utah 1998). Outdated and unenforced statutes
are not likely to meet this standard.

642

U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW

[Vol. 8:3

for requiring a connection between federal and state law. However, the
latter three rationales do provide some justification for such a requirement.
The second rationale provides a more substantive basis for requiring a
connection between state and federal law. It recognizes a basic fact of the
American political system-that there are two, sister sovereigns.
Whenever there are dual lawmakers, there is potential for differences to
exist between state and federal law. 101 In some conflicts between federal
and state law, federal law preempts state law. \02 However, in the public
policy arena, differences between state and federal law may not rise to the
level of a head-on conflict such that preemption would occur. In Sedlacek
v. Hillis/0 3 the Washington Supreme Court, sitting en bane, addressed such
a difference. The federal law upon which the plaintiff relied as a source of
public policy was the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), which
prohibits retaliation against employees by virtue of their relationship with a
qualified disabled employee. 104 State law, enacted after the ADA, did not
protect such associational interests. 105 In the face of the difference in the
two laws, the Washington Supreme Court held that federal law could not be
the source of viable public policy. \06 This approach is justifiable by virtue
of the fact that the tort itself is a creation of state law, not federal law.
Thus, unless there is a conflict such that federal law preempts state law,
where there are differences in policy, the state law based tort should be
based on state law. 107
In part, the Sedlacek court's justification for its decision rested on the
third rationale for requiring a connection between federal and state lawthat primary authority for articulating the public policy of a state rests with
the state legislature. \08 The degree to which states subscribe to the
proposition that the legislature is the fundamental source of a state's public

101. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 2 cmt. b, illus. 5-9
(2005) (describing the provisions in the U.S. Constitution which serve to limit the power of
the States).
102. See, e.g., Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200,214 (2004) (holding that the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act preempts the Texas Health Care Liability Act).·
103. 36 P.3d 1014 (Wash. 2001).
104. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4) (2000) (prohibiting the denial of equal jobs or benefits
based on associations with disabled employees).
105. See Sedlacek, 36 P.3d at 1020 (stating that the Washington statute did not provide
protections to those associated with disabled individuals).
106. Id. at 1021.
107. This is essentially the opposite side of the Supremacy Clause argument: if federal
law is not supreme in the sense that it preempts state law, then states are free to do as they
like with the contours of their tort laws.
108. See Sedlacek, 36 P.3d at 1019 ("[A]doption of a previously unrecognized public
policy under Washington law is better addressed to the Legislature."); see also Adler v. Am.
Standard Corp., 432 A.2d 464, 472 (Md. 1981) ("[D]eclaration of public policy is normally
the function of the legislative branch.").
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policy varies;I09 but even those states that do not limit the source of public
policy to the legislature agree that the legislature is at least a significant
source of the state's public policy.llo Since the state legislature is the
primary source of public policy, its approach should be given weight over
that of Congress's. In addition, given that a law could easily be passed at
the federal level without a single state representative or Senator voting for
it, a law passed at the state level, with a majority of that state's local
representatives voting for it, is clearly the more accurate representation of
what that state's public policies are.
As to the final argument for requiring a connection between federal
law and the state's public policies, there is certainly truth to the proposition
that unlimited allowance of federal law as the public policy of the state
would expand the potential number of claims employees could bring
because of the sheer volume offederallaw. 1ll Whether it would in fact add
such substantial numbers of protections that it would swallow the
employment at will rule is a far harder proposition to prove or disprove. 112
The limitations imposed on sources of public policy, specifically that the
policy must be "clear" and "substantial," would probably operate to
diminish the number of federal statutes and regulations that courts would
recognize as sources of public policy. 113
In sum, of the four rationales offered by courts for requiring a
connection between federal and state law in order for federal law to be the
public policy on which a wrongful discharge claim is based, three provide
some justification for the approach.
C.

Refusing to Allow Public Policy to Be Based on Federal Law.

As noted above, while no state has yet explicitly determined that
federal law can never be the public policy source for a wrongful discharge
109. Compare Lawrence Chrysler Plymouth Corp. v. Brooks, 465 S.E.2d 806 (Va. 1996)
(noting that source of public policy must be articulated in a state statute) with Pierce v.
Ortho Pharrn. Corp., 417 A.2d 505 (1980) (stating that the source of public policy can also
include regulations, judicial decisions, and in some cases, professional codes of ethics).
110. See, e.g., Pierce, 417 A.2d at 512 (listing the legislature, before other potential
items, as a source of public policy).
Ill. This is particularly true if administrative regulations are considered sources of
public policy, as some states have held. See, e.g., Green v. Ralee Eng'g Co., 960 P.2d 1046
(Cal. 1998) (stating that federal safety regulations are a source of public policy); Pierce, 417
A.2d at 512 (finding that administrative rules are a source of public policy).
112. See Hysten v. Burlington N. Sante Fe Ry. Co., 108 P.3d 437, 441 (Kan. 2004)
(dismissing the defendant employer's concem that "any federal law [would] become[]
fodder for a state law claim" as a "parade of horribles" argument and "a perennial favorite
oflitigants and their counsel").
113. See id. (explaining several limitations imposed on sources of public policy before
they may become the basis for a wrongful discharge claim).
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claim, several Virginia courts have suggested that this approach will be
taken. 114 Perhaps because the Virginia Supreme Court has not yet clearly
decided this issue, courts have not articulated a rationale for this position.
It appears to derive from the extremely narrow scope of the wrongful
discharge in violation of public policy claim in Virginia. ll5 Even without a
rationale or certain ruling, lower courts have refused to recognize claims
based on federal law based on the Virginia Supreme Court's statement that
the plaintiff must "identify a Virginia statute establishing the public policy"
relied upon. 116
Given the lack of articulated rationale, it is difficult to evaluate this
approach to disallowing federal law to be the public policy of the state.
However, the approach suffers from several weaknesses. While it is the
state's prerogative to determine the scope of its tort laws, once it has
articulated the idea that some policies are so important that they create an
exception, it is difficult to justify a flat ban on federal law as a source of
that policy. Also, this approach fails to account for the fact that states
cannot legislate in some areas of exclusively federal concern.117 Thus, for
some matters, there cannot be a state statute to articulate public policy.
Merely because there is no state statute does not necessarily indicate that
the state has no public interest in that area. Moreover, even in the absence
of a prohibition on state law, if the state has failed to legislate, such failure
might in part be based on the state's knowledge of an existing adequate
federal law, which should then be able to serve as the policy of the state.

114. See Lawrence Chrysler Plymouth Corp. v. Brooks, 465 S.E.2d 806, 809 (Va. 1996)
(noting that the plaintiff "does not have a cause of action for wrongful discharge because he
is unable to identify any Virginia statute establishing a public policy"); see also Oakley v.
May Oep't Stores Co., 17 F. Supp. 2d 533, 536 (E.D. Va. 1998) (holding that Title VII
cannot serve as a public policy and noting that the plaintiffs claim must be based on public
policies "derived from Virginia statutes, not federal laws"); Wenig v. Hecht Co., 47 Va. Cir.
290, 1998 WL 972350, at *3 (Fairfax Cty. Oct. 29, 1998) ("Wenig [the plaintiff] argues that
a federal statute can serve as the basis for her wrongful termination action. This argument
fails in that Wenig is obliged to cite a Virginia statute to support her claim.").
115. See Rowan v. Tractor Supply Co., 559 S.E.2d 709, 711 (Va. 2002) (noting that "we
continue to consider this exception to be a 'narrow' exception ... ").
116. Oakley, 17 F. Supp. 2d at 536 (citations omitted); see also Wenig, 1998 WL
972350, at *3 (citing Lawrence, 465 S.E.2d at 809).
117. For example, regulating interstate commerce is limited to the federal government.
See Ann Althouse, Enforcing Federalism After United States v. Lopez, 38 ARIZ. L. REv.
793,818-19 (1996) (explaining why states are not capable of, and thus are constitutionally
prohibited from, regulating interstate commerce). Other examples that arise more
frequently in the employment context include employee benefit plans (preempted by
ERISA) and matters involving unions (preempted by the NLRA). See also Tristin K. Green,
Comment, Complete Preemption-Removing the Mystery from Removal, 86 CAL. L. REv.
363, 363 (1998) (addressing the doctrine of federal question removal based on complete
preemption).
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IV. A PROPOSED MODEL FOR ANALYZING FEDERAL LAW AS A SOURCE
OF PUBLIC POLICY

Part III established that there are flaws with the current rationales and
approaches taken by the courts in detennining when federal law articulates
the public policy of a state. What is needed, then, is an analytically sound
approach to the issue. This Part articulates such an approach to detennine
whether federal law is an appropriate source of public policy, and uses Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 118 as an example of this analysis. 119
The approach begins with an initial premise that courts should directly
address the issue and not simply assume that federal law articulates the
public policy of the states. There is a very simple reason for this: anytime
that federal law is involved, there is a potential for federal law to preempt
state law. Thus, although many courts have done SO,120 courts should not
assume that federal law is to be treated the same as state law because of the
possible preemption of state tort law remedies by federal law.
There are three ways that state law can be preempted. First, federal
law expressly preempts state law when the federal statute so provides. 121
Second, federal law preempts state law when there is a comprehensive
federal regulatory scheme indicating that Congress "left no room" for state
law on the topic ("field" preemption). 122 Third, where state law actually
conflicts with federal law such that compliance with both is impossible, or
where state law is an obstacle to the operation of federal law, state law is
preempted. 123 When federal law is the articulated source for a claim of
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, anyone of these three
theories of preemption may apply. Given the potential for preemption to
prevent a wrongful discharge claim based on federal law, 124 it should be the
first major consideration of the court in detennining whether a complaint
states a claim.
Using Title VII as an exemplar, the statute does not purport to
expressly preempt state law generally.125 Nor is there any indication that
118. 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (2005).
119. Title VII was selected because it has been cited in numerous cases as a federal law
supporting a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.
120. See Parts III.B and lII.C, supra (discussing the failure of some courts to directly
address how federal law should be analyzed when cited as a source of public policy).
121. See Cal. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272,280 (1987) (citing Jones
v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977)).
122. See id. at 281 (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218,230 (1947)).
123. Id. at 281 (citations omitted).
124. See Ewing v. Koppers, 537 A.2d 1173, 1178 (Md. 1988) (discussing preemption of
wrongful discharge action by LMRA).
125. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (2000). See Cal. Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n, 479 U.S. at 28182 (stating state law would be preempted only if it conflicted with federal law); see also
Henry H. Drummonds, The Sister Sovereign States: Preemption and the Second Twentieth
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Title VII was intended to occupy the field and impliedly preempt state law;
indeed, Title VII explicitly disclaims such intent. 126 Title VII only
preempts state law where state law requires or permits an act which is
unlawful under Title VII.127 Thus, only in the situation where a wrongful
discharge claim would require or permit acts that Title VII prohibits would
there be a preemption issue, and this situation appears unlikely to occur. 128
If preemption does not occur, the next step in the analysis is to
determine whether federal law accurately articulates a state's public policy
such that it provides a proper basis for a wrongful discharge claim. As
noted in Part III, assuming either that federal law is equivalent to state law
or that it cannot ever be a source of public policy is analytically unsound.
As to the former, there are two main reasons why courts should not assume
that federal law can automatically serve as the public policy of the state.
First, the state may not have a sufficient interest in the federal law to allow
it to serve as the state's public policy.129 Second, it is quite possible for
there to be a difference between federal and state law, and it would be
improper to assume that federal law accurately articulates the state's public
policy. \30 Indeed, basic tenets of federalism enunciated in the Constitution,
bolstered by the country's long history of recognizing the benefits offered
Century Revolution in the Law of the American Workplace, 62 FORDHAM L. REv. 469, 537
(1993) (discussing when the FLSA supplants state law). For an example of a statute with an
express preemption provision, see the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA),
29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1998).
126. 42 U.S.c. § 2000h-4 (2000). See Cal. Fed. Savings & Loan Ass 'n, 479 U.S. at 28182 (discussing § 1104 of Title XI, applicable to all sections of the Civil Rights Act,
including Title VII, which indicates that Congress did not intend to occupy the field of state
law if it existed). ERISA provides an example of field preemption, as the Supreme Court
has held that the statutory remedial scheme in ERISA preempts state law remedies which
are alternatives to ERISA's even where the state law in question is not "expressly"
preempted by the statute. See Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 214 (2004)
(holding that state court actions alleging an HMO's failure to cover certain services violated
state laws are preempted by ERISA).
127. See Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272,281 (1987) (discussing
preemption of state law by federal statute); see also Drummonds, supra note 125 (declaring
that state laws will be preempted by federal laws if there is conflict). The three preemption
categories overlap; for example, ERISA contains an express preemption provision, occupies
the field, and also preempts statutes which actually conflict with it. See Aetna Health, 542
U.S. 200, 214 n.4 (discussing different ways in which ERISA can preempt state law).
128. In contrast to the lack of preemption concerns under Title VII, federal labor laws,
specifically the NLRA and Section 301 of the LMRDA, pose significant preemption
potential. Indeed, federal labor laws preempt state law claims based on employee actions
which are arguably protected or prohibited by the NLRA. See San Diego Bldg. Trades
Council, Millman's Union Local 2020 v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 236 (1953).
129. As noted in Peterson v. Browning, 832 P.2d 1280 (Utah 1992), states do not always
have an interest in enforcing federal laws.
130. See, e.g., Sedlacek, 36 P.3d at 1020 (holding that the differences between the ADA
and Washington state's antidiscrimination law preclude the use of the ADA as a source of
public policy).
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by states having the freedom to establish their own laws, recognizes this
point. Nor is the contrary position tenable because it ignores the fact that,
at times, there cannot be state law on the topic because only the federal
government is authorized to enact law.13I In effect, to reach this
conclusion, a court would be declaring that within those areas of law that
are exclusively federal in nature, there are no important public policies that
states should vindicate.
Given that the all-or-nothing positions outlined above are analytically
unsound, what remains is to determine what inquiry a court should
undertake to ascertain whether a particular federal law should serve as a
state's public policy. In determining whether a federal law articulates a
state's public policy such that it provides a proper basis for a wrongful
discharge claim, courts should consider whether the state has an interest in
promoting greater enforcement of that area of law. 132 Where there is no or
little state interest in the .particular area of law, the court should not rely on
federal law as a basis for the public policy claim. Returning to the Title
VII example, states do have an interest in enforcing anti-discrimination
laws.133 In contrast, states may not have an interest in promoting greater
enforcement of immigration laws if the state's economy depends heavily
on immigrant labor and there are concerns about lack of workers to fill
existing jobs. 134
If the state does have an interest in promoting greater enforcement of
that area of law, the next step should be determining whether it is
appropriate for the state to create a new remedy, in light of the federal law.
Here, courts should be sensitive to the potential difficulties inherent in
Congress and federal agencies responding to court decisions. As noted in
131. For example, only the federal government can regulate international trade. See Hal
S. Shapiro, Is There a Role for Sub-Federal Governments in International Trade Policy
Formation?, 9 IUS GENTIUM 73, 83 (2003) (noting that the Constitution seems to allow
states even "less freedom to act with respect to foreign commerce than interstate
commerce").
132. See, e.g., Olguin v. Inspiration Conso!. Copper Co., 740 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1984)
(holding Illinois state law does not have an interest in protecting whistleblowers under the
Federal Aviation Act), overruled on other grounds by Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471
U.S. 202 (1985); Rachford v. Evergreen Int'! Airlines, Inc., 596 F. Supp. 384,385 (N.D. III.
1984) (declaring the lack of state interest in enforcing federal aviation law before dismissing
the plaintiffs wrongful discharge action).
133. Evidence of this interest is seen in the state laws which mirror Title VII. If there is
no state statute mirroring the federal law, this inquiry becomes more difficult.
134. The argument can be made that in the post-September II, 2001 world, states do
have an interest in greater enforcement of federal immigration laws; however, most of the
focus has been on immigrants from parts of the world where anti-American sentiment and
rhetoric run strong. See Matt Carreto, Selective Enforcement of the Immigration Laws: Is
There Any Possible External Constraint on the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion?, 18
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 639, 646, n.57 (2005) (describing the executive's use of immigration
laws as a pretext to detain aliens with suspected terrorist ties).
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Part III, the sheer volume of court decisions that Congress would need to
remain abreast of to respond to is daunting. Perhaps more importantly,
there is the possibility that Congress could not, in fact, revise federal law in
a manner that would "correct" state court decisions that are seen as being at
odds with the federal law. This is also an issue where the public policy is
embodied in a federal regulation; any questions about the power of
Congress to revise federal law in a manner that effectively overrules a state
court's decision is at least equally a concern when it is a federal agency that
would be seeking to "correct" a decision.
Courts should also be sensitive to creating rights that are inconsistent
with the federal law on which the wrongful discharge claim is based. Title
VII provides an example of how allowing a state wrongful discharge action
might undermine the intent of a federal statute. Taken together, the
damages and coverage provisions of Title VII indicate an intent to limit a
small employer's exposure to damages under the statute. 135 Title VII only
covers employers with 15 or more employees. 136 Small employers are
expressly exempted from coverage. Title VII also contains a sliding scale
regarding the amount of damages that can be awarded. There is a cap on
the amount of compensatory and punitive damages that can be awarded to
employees: employees of larger companies are limited to $300,000, while
employees of the smallest covered companies are limited to $50,000. 137
This sliding scale reflects a desire to provide more protection against
damages awards for smaller companies than larger ones.
If employees are allowed to base wrongful discharge claims on Title
VII, employers can be liable for unlimited tort damages, regardless of the
company's size. This is inconsistent with the coverage provision and
damages caps contained in Title VII. While Title VII does not expressly
prohibit this result, it is still pertinent to inquire whether courts should
allow this situation to occur. While the goals of preventing discrimination
and providing recompense to victims of discrimination are obviously
laudable, it is far from clear that this is the appropriate manner for reaching
this goal. Congress made express decisions determining coverage and
damages caps; should this legislative decision be made irrelevant by courts
creating an alternative to the statute?
Clearly, Congress left room for states to add to the protections of Title
VII. However, for states to do so, not by legislatively determining what to
add, but rather by having courts cite Title VII but then ignore portions of its
135. See Caren Sencer, Comment, When a Boss Isn't an Employer: Limitations of Title
VII Coverage, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 441, 477 (2004) ("The legislative history of
Title VII's definition of 'employer' shows that Congress wanted to avoid placing too many
extra burdens on small employers ....").
136. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e(b) (2005).
137. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (2005).
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provisions, undercuts the federal legislative scheme. The results of the case
depend upon the individual determinations of judges who may not even
fully recognize or discuss the potential conflict between the federal law and
state wrongful discharge remedy. 138 One wonders how legislators who
craft federal law would respond to the idea that the legislative enactments,
which are limited in scope, can become the basis for a claim which is not
so limited. In other words, once Congress has declared an action to be
unlawful, it does not matter what else is in the statute-a potential
wrongful discharge claim has been created which may not be limited in the
way Congress stated or intended. 139
Returning to the proposed model of analysis, if federal law does not
preempt the wrongful discharge claim, the state has an interest in
promoting greater enforcement of the federal law, and allowing the claim is
not inconsistent with the federal statutory scheme then. The court should
then proceed to determine whether the federal law fulfills the state's
requirements for being the source of public policy for a wrongful discharge
claim. The above process, then, is the precursor to the substantive analysis
of whether there is a sufficiently important public policy to allow the claim
for wrongful discharge to proceed.
V.

CONCLUSION

To date, the bulk of wrongful discharge claims have relied on state,
not federal law. However, given the sheer volume of federal statutes and
regulations, it may not be long before creative plaintiffs' attorneys begin to
realize the potentially vast expansion of the public policy doctrine available
using federal law. The current lack of a uniform, analytically sound
approach to determine whether federal law articulates the public policy of a
state needs to be examined, and should be replaced with the approach
outlined in this Article, which balances the interests of the state and the
federal government and recognizes the nature of our federalist system.

138. A similar issue with providing state law remedies that conflict with Title VII was
addressed in Phillips v. St. Mary Regional Medical Center, 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 770, 785 (Cal.
App. 2002), but was brushed aside by the court's comment that conflicting remedies "serve
the purpose of maximizing plaintiffs opportunity to seek relief from discrimination." The
court failed to note that this "purpose" of maximizing an employee's relief is not in fact a
purpose of Title VII, which has limited remedies for discrimination, thus glossing over the
true conflict.
139. If an increase in this type of litigation were to occur, a potential result of this may
be an increase in express preemption provisions contained in federal laws as Congress
attempts to limit the scope of federal law to what is articulated therein.

